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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a corporation, as Executor of
the ESTATE OF JAMES C. DEMIRIS, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

IPHEGENEA, P. DEMIRIS,

Case No.
8982

Defendant and Respondent .

.MARGARETA DEMIRIS PAPACASTAS, CONSTANTINO C. DEMIRIS, ATHANASIOS DEMIRIS,
PETER DEMIRIS and JOHN DEMIRIS,

Intervenors and Appellants.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~TS

INTRODUCTION
This case was an Equity case tried without a jury before
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court in September of 1958. The plaintiff, the executor
1
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of the Estate of James C. Demiris, deceased, and the intervenors, brothers and sisters of said decedent and beneficiaries
under his Will, joined together in asserting two causes of
action against the defendant widow.
James C. Demiris died childless and testate at the age
of 74 years on January 23, 1957 in St. Mark's Hospital, Salt
Lake City, Utah. He had been committed to the hospital on
December 21, 1956 in an incompetent state resulting from
acute senile dementia. Between the time he was committed and
his death, approximately one month later, his widow, the defendant, withdrew the sum of $73,046.44 from eight joint
bank accounts and cashed U. S. Savings Bonds having a value
of $9700.00. This total amount of $82,746.44 reduced to possession by the widow just prior to her husband's demise represented substantially all of the estate created by her husband
during his lifetime, except for an interest in a note and mortgage being collected by the First Security Bank, having a
value of approximately $16,000.00. Four of the bank accounts
involved, with sums totalling $38,404.45, were changed from
the name of James C. Demiris alone to joint accounts with
his wife on December 5, 1956, 16 days prior to his hospitalization; while the other four accounts had been established
initially as joint acounts some years before.
Under the terms of the Will of James C. Demiris admitted to probate, each of his four brothers and his sister, the
intervenors in this case, all of whom survived him, was to
receive bequests of $10,000.00 each and the balance of his
estate was to go to his wife, the defendant. In addition the
deceased had a life insurance policy of $10,000.00 with his
wife as the beneficiary.
2
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The first cause of action was to recover from the defendant
the sum of $38,404.45, the amount obtained by her from
the four accounts that were made joint on December 5, 1956.
It was claimed that at the time the accounts were changed on
December 5th that James Demiris was mentally incompetent
and that the defendant exercised undue influence over him so
that the opening of the joint accounts was ineffective and null
and void, and the funds contained therein were properly a
part of the decedent's estate.
The second cause of action sought to recover the amount
of $82,746.74, the total of the eight bank accounts, including
the four accounts in the first cause of action and the U. S.
Savings Bonds having a value of $9700.00 which the defendant
reduced to possession by withdrawing the accounts and cashing
the bonds after her husband had been hospitalized in an incompetent state on December 21, 1956 and prior to his death
on January 23, 1957. It was contended that the funds were
the sole property of her husband, that no valid gift thereof
had been made to her in his lifetime and that by reason of this
conduct she held the monies in trust for the use and benefit
of her husband, and after his death for his estate. The defendant answered that her husband was competent on December
5, 1956; that she had exercised no undue influence over him
and that all of the sums obtained by her totalling $82,746.74
was her property. She also asserted a counterclaim against
the plaintiff executor for the sum of $16,000.00 which was
the value of the interest owned by her deceased husband in
the said note and mortgage being collected by the executor
bank and which the bank is administering in her husband's
estate pursuant to the terms of his will.
3
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The deceased, James C. Demiris, was born in a small town
in Greece, the eldest child in a family of six children. He emigrated to this country in 1902 at the age of 19 years. The
other five Demiris children were born after Jim at two-year
intervals and were John, Peter, Gus, Tom and Margaret, the
Intervenors in this case (T-121, 122). Peter joined Jim in
America in 1906 at the age of 18 and John followed in 1907
(T-122). The brothers located in Salt Lake City and for a
time ran a herd of dairy cows. Jim began in the hotel business,
his .life work, in 1908, when he acquired the Albany Hotel.
The brothers had a very close relationship and worked together,·
pooling their resources. According to the custom of their
native land, Jim, the eldest, was the head of the family and
as such, handled all of the money and business affairs (T-123,
124). Jim sold the Albany Hotel in 1910 and built the Pacific
Hotel. John and Peter worked intermittently for Jim at both
the Albany and Pacific Hotels and held certain other jobs for
a number of years until they acquired their own businesses
and were married. During this period they turned their earnings over to Jim, who handled the family finances (T-125),
and forwarded what could be spared back to their family in
Greece. In 1923 the three brothers together built the Oakwood
Apartments at the corner of 6th South and 5th East in Salt
Lake City. Jim Demiris owned 263/400 interest therein, and
Peter and John owned the balance equally (T-126, 184, 185)
(Ex. 1, 2, & 3).
Jim remained single until 1925 when, at the age of 42
years, he returned to Greece and married the defendant. After
the marriage in Athens, Jim and the defendant came back to
4
\
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Salt Lake to live. In 1928 the defendant went back to Greece
on a visit and remained there about three years. She again
went back to Greece in 1935 and remained until 1946 (T. 168,
186). Thus, while Jim and the defendant were married some
31 years, they were separated approximately 13 years of this
time. Jim made most of his money during the war years at
the Pacific Hotel while Mrs. Demiris was in Greece (T-127).
He sold this hotel in 1948 and the following year the three
brothers sold the Oakwood Apartments. Jim retired from
active business after the sale of the apartments in 1949 (T-186,
187) ..
Soon after they were married Jim and the defendant
began having marital difficulties. The main source of trouble
was the defendant's insistence that Jim sell his holdings and
return to Greece to live (T-129, 142, 187). In 1951 the
marital trouble became so bad that both Jim and the defendant
consulted attorneys about a divorce. At this period they
separated for approximately one month's time, and during
this separation Jim had Mr. E. R. Callister, Jr., his attorney,
offer the defendant $10,000.00 if she would divorce him
(T-106, 107).
In 1952, following the death of the defendant's mother
in Greece, Jim and the defendant went there for a visit for
several months. On March 19, 1952, prior to departing for
Greece, Jim had Mr. Callister prepare a will that left specific
bequests of $5,000.00 each to his four brothers and his sister
and the balance to his wife (Ex. P-4). On March 25, 1952
Jim returned to Mr. Callister's office with the defendant and
told him that he wanted a new will which was then prepared,

5
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leaving $1,000.00 only to each of the two brothers and one
sister in Greece and nothing to the brothers, John and Peter
in America, and the balance to his wife, with the provision
that if the defendant predecease him that one-half of his
estate go to her family and one-half to his family (T-102,
103, 104) (Ex. P-5). The next day, March 26, 1952 Jim returned
to l\fr. Callister's office alone and said that he had made the
Will the day before only to appease his wife and it was not
what he wanted at all (T-105). He told Mr. Callister that
he was concerned about his wife getting all his money, that
he wanted his brothers and sister to share in his estate and
that he did not want her family to participate at all (T-109).
He thereupon instructed Mr. Callister to prepare the Will that
was admitted to probate which left $10,000.00 to each of his
four brothers and a sister and the balance to his wife (Ex. P-6).
Upon their return from Greece in 1952 they moved back
into the Oakwood Apartments. The marital troubles continued.
Some of the other tenants in the Apartments reported that
they could hear violent quarrels and fights frequently (T-149).
On one such occasion a tenant called the police (T-290).
During these fights, which usually occurred at night, Mrs.
Demiris' shouts and cries could be heard throughout the
apartment (T-149, 177, 289). Jim told a number of his
friends of his troubles with his wife and the unhappiness
which she caused him, patricularly in 1956, the last year of
his life. John Condas, a friend for 45 years, reported that in
the late summer of 1956 Jim told him of the troubles he was
having with his wife and that she was constantly hollering
at him to return to Greece (T-118). John Pragastis, another
close friend, also heard from Jim during 1956 of his marital
6
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troubles and Jim told him that the only solution was divorce
(T-142).
Ted Jouflas knew Jim and the defendant only slightly.
In the summer of 1956 he saw them on the corner of 3rd
South and Main Street. His attention was drawn to them
because they were speaking in Greek and the defendant was
using very profane language (T-160, 161). They were arguing
about money and she said to her husband that he didn't have
long to live and when he died she would get all of his money
(T-162). Mrs. Frank Vlcek, a neighbor and friend of the
Demirises in the Oakwood Apartments, asked the defendant
about a bruise on her arm in the summer of 1956. The defendant told her that Jim had caused the bruise in a fight over
money and that she had offered to leave him if he would giv,.
her $60,000.00 (T-150). Mrs. Vlcek said that the arguments
which the Demirises had had throughout her stay in the
Oakwod Apartments continued unabated throughout the late
fall of 1956 (T-151). Mr. Alke T. Diamant, an attorney in
Sailt Lake City, had known Jim Demiris for 25 years. Between
July and early November in 1956 he saw Jim on several occasions on the street and twice in his law office where Jim came
for consultation (T-153). Jim told Mr. Diamant of his marital
troubles and asked how much he would have to pay his wife
in order to obtain a divorce from her. Jim said that he would
pay as much as $40,000.00 to get rid of her (T-154). Jim
told Mr. Diamant that Mr. Callister had prepared a will for
him which he wished checked to be sure that his brothers and
sister would share in his estate when he died. He said that
he disliked his wife's family very much and feared that they
might poison him for his money ( T -15 5) .
7
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In the late summer and fall of 1956 the relatives and close
friends of Jim Demiris noticed a gradual change in him. He
became nervous and unable to sit for long without pacing
around ( T -118) . He became quiet and uncommunicative
where before he used to talk a lot about business affairs and
politics with his old friends (T-131). In September his memory
began to slip (T-131). He became forgetful (T-178) and
absent-minded (T-143). He became less active and stopped
going out as much as before (T-178). His friend, John
Pragastis, said that in the fall of 1956 Jim seemed different,
almost as though he was broken in spirit (T-143). October
26, 1956 was Jim's name day and according to the Greek
custom his friends and relatives visited him at his apartment.
They testified that Jim had nothing to say and hid behind
his paper during their visit (T-145, 169).
Jim's brother, John, had been closer to him through the
years than anyone else. After Jim's retirement in 1949 he used
to visit John's grocery store on 8th South and 6th East nearly
every day and sometimes twice a day (T-188). Because of
this close association, John was one of the first to observe
the changes coming over his brother. In September of 1956,
he noticed Jim's memory "start to get bad" (T-188), and
Jim commenced to repeat himself (T-189). Jim had been able
to speak, read, and write the English language quite well
( T -134) and had been particularly adept with figures. In
September, Jim was unable to figure the dividends due him
on his insurance policy so that John had to help him (T-197).
In October of 1956 John sold his grocery store and retired.
However, he continued to see Jim almost every day. He noticed
that Jim seemed to be getting worse and in addition to his
8
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memory slipping he seemed very tired and complained about
his health, particularly about his feet (T-192).
Alke Diamant also noticed the changes in Jim and said
that when he saw Jim for the last time in early November,
Jim seemed to be under tremendous strain (T -158). On
November 9 John and Jim agreed to send some money to their
sister Margaret, who was ill in Greece. Jim was unable to
write anything to her in their letter (T -191). He got worse
in November and on the 26th, while John was in town with
him, Jim acted very strange and couldn't remember his wife's
name (T-132-133). John was so concerned over Jim's conduct
then that he insisted he immediately go with him to a doctor.
They went to a Dr. Walker's office in the Boston Building,
but the doctor was unable to see Jim on that day and an
appointment was made for the following week (T-193). On
leaving the doctor's office they went to the corner of Third
South and Main Street, where Jim asked John where he was.
He appeared lost (T-194). The following day John visited
Jim at his apartment and told the defendant that Jim was
sick and that he had made an appointment for him with Dr.
Walker (T-195). The defendant cancelled Jim's appointment
with Dr. Walker and told John that she would take him to
her doctor, Dr. Diumenti in Bountiful (T-15) (T-202).
John visited Jim on November 29 and found him to be
"quite bad." He didn't want to talk and his personality seemed
entirely changed (T-196). John never saw his brother Jim
down town or alone again after November 26, 1956 (T-202).
The defendant took her husband to Dr. A. E. Callahan for
new glasses on November 28, 1956. This eye doctor found

9
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that Jim was suffering from cataracts (T-211). The doctor,
however, seeing him for the first time, said he seemed to
respond normally to the questions (T-213).
On December 1, John, together with his nephew Chris
and his niece, Helen, children of his brother Peter, prevailed
on the defendant to take Jim with them to Dr. Phil M.
Howard (T-198). On that date Dr. Howard gave Jim a
general physical examination and found him to be physically
normal. No examination was made of Jim's mental condition;
however, the doctor stated that Jim Demiris appeared mentally
dull and did not answer or appear to comprehend the questions
that were directed to him. These questions were promptly
taken up and answered by the defendant, who, according to
the doctor, "appeared to dominate the situation" (T-100).
Dr. Howard said that from the history that was given to him
by the defendant, namely that Jim was forgetful, having
trouble with his legs, and would get lost and wander away
from the apartment, he concluded that Jim was suffering
from senile arteria sclerosis, or senile dementia, and suggested that Jim consult a neurologist (T-100). The defandant
denied telling Dr. Howard that Jim had been forgetful (T-18)
and testified that Jim had been "very well" when Dr. Howard
had seen him (T-23). She ~ontended that Jim did the talking
to Dr. Howard and that the doctor had said there was nothing
wrong with him (T-19).
The day following Dr. Howard's examination was a
Sunday and John and Peter Demiris, together with Peter's
son, Chris, took Jim and the defendant for a ride down State
Street to Midvale. During the ride Jim said very little and
10
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when questioned didn't recognize the town of Murray (T-132,
T-198). After the ride they returned to Peter's home, where
Jim was very nervous, wouldn't talk and just sat and looked
around. He didn't seem to recognize his own brother, Peter
(T-133) (T-193), (T-171, 172).
On December 5, 1956 the four savings accounts constituting the first cause of action totalling $38,404.45, were
changed from single accounts standing in Jim's name to joint
accounts with defendant. The defendant testified that early
in the morning of December 5, her husband awakened her
and told her that he remembered something. Thereupon they
went downtown together to the banks and signed the cards
making the accounts joint (T-114).
A day or two following the changing of the accounts
the defendant made an appointment for her husband with
Dr. Diumenti on December 14, 1956. On December 10, 1956
she went with her husband to the First Security Bank, where
they talked with Floyd Long, a trust officer, about the note
and mortgage that the bank was collecting from the sale of
the Oakwood Apartments. Jim's interest therein amounted to
approximately $16,000.00 at the time. Mr. Long indicated that
Mr. Demiris did not appear abnormal to him, but that while Jim
was addressing him in English, the defendant was continually
talking to Jim in Greek. He said Jim told him that he wanted
his wife's name to be placed on the monthly remittances by
the bank so that she could cash the checks and have some
money if he were sick (T-258, 263). Mr. Long then prepared
the letter of instruction (Ex. D-20) which Jim and his wife
then signed at the Trust window (T-259). Mr. Long noted
11
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that the defendant appeared anxious to get her name on the
check and took an active part in the transaction (T-264) ·
Two friends of Mrs. Demiris, Mary Bombas and Anne
Tiano, visited several times with the defendant and Jim during the first two weeks of December. Mrs. Bombas thought
Jim seemed all right on these occasions (T-273, 247). Mrs.
Tiano testified that she did not notice anything unusual about
Jim's converstaions (T-281). However, Lenora O'Connell,
another friend of and witness for the defendant, who had
lived in the Oakwood Apartments for 15 years, testified that
she had visited Jim briefly nearly every day and that he had
told her he did not feel good and further he appeared sick
two or three weeks before he went to the hospital (T-286).
She said that for a month or six weeks before his hospitalization
he hadn't been as active and that when Mr. Demiris had
gotten sick he had just seemed to give up (T-290).
Mrs. Helen Tsimpoukis and Mrs. Georgia Demas, two
Greek friends of the defendant, testified that they had heard
about the bank accounts being transferred before Jim went to
the hospital. Mrs. Tsimpoukis volunteered that on December
7, 1956 at her home one of them said "He went to the bank
and changed the books" (T-293). She also testified that she
saw Jim again on the 12th or 13th and on the 19th or 20th
of December. She claimed not to have noticed anything wrong
with him on the 13th (T-294) (T-304). She admitted, however, that on December 19th, although Jim recognized her,
talked with her, and seemed all right, that he claimed to see
crowds of people outside of his window when there weren't
any people there (T-295, 296). Mrs. Olympia Demiris, the
12
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wife of Peter Demiris, and Helen Demiris, her daughter, both
testified that they had visited with Mrs. T~impoukis at her
apartment on November 25, 1956 and that she then told them
that Jim had not been feeling well and that she was concerned
about him (T-342).
Mrs. Demas, an elderly Greek lady, had moved into the
Oakwood Apartments across the hall from the Demirises a
little over a month before Jim went to the hospital (T-328).
She said she saw Jim a number of times and that she observed
nothing wrong with him before he went to see Dr. Powell
(T-320). She claimed that Jim told her the last time he went
uptown that he had drawn the checks and money to his wife
and they discussed that the defendant now would be able to
take care of Jim if he became ill (T-323). Mrs. Demas then
volunteered the fact that Jim and the defendant never had
any fights together (T-324, 318). The defendant's physician,
Dr. George Diumenti, saw Jim Demiris on December 14,
1956 and gave him a physical examination. He found him to
be physically alright, but because of the history given by the
defendant of her husband's forgetfulness and his failure to
respond to the doctor's questions, he referred him to a neurosurgeon for a determination of his mental condition.
On December 18, 1956 Dr. Chester B. Powell, the neurosurgeon to whom Jim Demiris had been referred by Dr.
Diumenti, examined him for the first time. Dr. Powell observed
that the defendant, who was with Jim, was in a distraught,
emotional state, while Jim sat quietly without speaking (T-63,
65). She told the doctor that she had had her husband to
several doctors but that they had been unable to help him
13
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and that she was greatly concerned about his condition (T-63,
64). A history was obtained by Dr. Powell from both the
defendant and John Demiris, together, that Jim had been
very forgetful, repetitious, and confused for three weeks and
that he had suffered a severe loss of appetite. Further, he had
become physically inactive and had changed regarding his
interests (T-65). The defendant not only did not dispute any
part of this history, but was so vehement about the changes
her husband had suffered that the doctor was inclined to discount her assertions as exaggerated (T-77). After a complete
neurological examination the doctor diagnosed the patient's
condition as acute senile mental deterioration with irregular
changes in the brain (T-67). He discussed this diagnosis and
the prognosis with the defendant (T-75). At the trial, the
defendant denied telling Dr. Powell that her husband was
having any trouble except with his eyes and legs (T -25) and
claimed that she noticed nothing wrong with him before Dr.
Powell gave him "electricity for the brain" (T-16). She also
claimed Dr. Powell said Jim was in very good condition (T-27).
Dr. Powell was called to the Demiris apartment in the
Oakwood on December 21, 1956, where he found Jim
totally disorientated, sitting quietly and smiling. He immediately arranged for Jim's hospitalization at the St. Mark's
Hospital and continued to treat him until his death on January
23, 1957 (T-77). During his hospitalization Jim remained
in a state of total disorientation with his memory entirely
gone. An autopsy was performed which revealed moderately
severe nerve cell degeneration called senile placques, which
indicate senile dementia (T-78).

14
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Dr. Powell testified that when he first saw Jim Demiris
on December 18, the patient was "incompetent for all ordinary
activities of life" (T -80), and was "unable to respond in an
intelligent fashion or exercise any degree of judgment" (T-81).
The doctor stated that in his opinion it was improbable and
medically quite unlikely that Jim Demiris had been competent
within one to four months prior to the time he had first seen
him (T-85). On cross examination the doctor admitted that
it was "possible" for changes to occur quite rapidly in senile
dementia cases and that such a condition "possibly" could have
occurred within a period of a few days (T-90). His opinion
that the incompetency had existed 1-4 months prior to
December 18, 1956 was made, according to the doctor, with
reasonable medical certainty in light of all of the facts and
circumstances (T -82, 85) including the history, the extensive
interview and tests of the patient, the observation during
treatment, and the results of the autopsy.
The defendant admitted that she never had any money
or property of her own during her marriage to Jim Demiris
and that all of her husband's estate was owned by him (T-7).
She further admitted that before December, 1956 she had no
knowledge of the bank accounts, or even that her name was
on any of them (T -34). Between the time that her husband
was hospitalized on December 21, 1956 and his death on
January 23, 1957 and while he was in a state of complete
incompetence, the defendant withdrew all of the money that
her husband had placed in the various bank accounts totalling
$73,046.44, and cashed United States Savings Bonds held in
their joint names totalling $9,700.00. She claimed that her
husband had told her in December, 1956 that if he went to
15
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the hospital that she should put the money in just her name
( T -114) , however, in her deposition the defendant testified
that Jim had told her to do this while he was in the hospital
and that it was Jim who had cashed all the savings bonds
(T-41-42). On cross examination she admitted the reason
she withdrew the money was because she was afraid the
Demirises might get it (T-49).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DECEASED, JAMES C. DEMIRIS, WAS COMPETENT
TO MAKE A GIFT ON DECEMBER 5, 1956, THE TIME
OF THE PURPORTED TRANSFERS OF INTEREST IN
HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANT FOR
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY
SHOWED THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT AT THAT
TIME.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE DEFENDANT EXERCISED UNDUE INFLUENCE AND DOMINATED HER HUSBAND IN THE
CREATION OF THE JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS IN DECEMBER OF 1956.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
DECEASED INTENDED TO MAKE A GIFT TO THE
16
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DEFENDANT OF MONIES IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS
AND U. S. SAVINGS BONDS IN THE ABSENCE OF
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AS TO THAT
FACT.
POINT IV
IF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IS CREATED BY
ANY DEPOSIT CARDS THAT DECEASED INTENDED
TO MAKE A GIFT TO DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFFS OVERCAME SUCH PRESUMPTION BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
DEPOSIT CARDS ON THE TWO CONTINENTAL BANK
ACCOUNTS GRANTED ANY INTEREST THEREIN TO
THE DEFENDANT.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE
THAT IF A JOINT TENANCY WAS CREATED IN ANY
OF THE ACCOUNTS AND IN THE U. S. SAVINGS
BONDS, THAT SUCH JOINT TENANCY WAS TERMINATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL BY DEFENDANT OF
THE ENTIRE AMOUNTS IN THE ACCOUNTS AND THE
CASHING OF THE BONDS DURING THE LIFETIME
OF HER HUSBAND.
17
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE DECEASED, JAMES C. DEMIRIS, WAS COMPETENT
TO MAKE A GIFT ON DECEMBER 5, 1956, THE TIME
OF THE PURPORTED TRANSFERS OF INTEREST IN
HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANT FOR
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY
SHOWED THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT AT THAT
TIME.
The test of a person's competency to create a joint tenancy
or make a valid gift is whether he was mentally competent
to deal with the subject before him with a full understanding
of his rights and actually understood the nature, purpose, and
effect of what he did. The creation and gift must be a conscious and purposeful act. (Maxon v. Avery, 43 C.A. (2) 155,
110 P(2) 446).
Before considering the various facts and circumstances
testified to regarding the deceased's mental condition, it may
be well to consider briefly what senile dementia is, and how
it affected Jim's competency and ultimately contributed to his
demise. The symptoms of senile dementia or senile deterioration of the brain are, according to Dr. Chester A. Powell,
a neurologist, a general decrease of activity, together with
changes in the memory, orientation, and judgment (T-71).
The patient tends to forget the present and dwells in the
past. He has difficulty relating himself to his environment
and becomes confused as to where he is and how he got there.
His judgment becomes affected so that he cannot exercise
18
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normal mental processes in arriving at a decision, important
or minor, or make a proper judgment considering facts that
should be considered (T-71, 72). As the person's mental
activity becomes difficult, he begins to withdraw and refrain
from participating or performing. The emotions become blunted
and the individual's personality changes, with depression
being a common symptom (T-72-73). The patient being
aware of his growing difficulty very often makes a good superficial adjustment by avoiding difficult situations and contacts.
Because of this and the fact that the early changes are subtle
and difficult to discern, only those persons in close contact
with the patient can observe the changes, and then sometimes
only in retrospect (T-74).
The testimony of the deceased's family, with the exception of his wife, clearly shows a pattern of behavior by Jim
Demiris indicating the symptoms of senile dementia, as outlined by Dr. Powell, which commenced in September of 1956,
when they first noticed his becoming forgetful and repetitious
and developing until early December when he seemed entirely changed (T-196). John Demiris saw more of Jim than
the others and therefore observed more of his difficulties.
He described numerous incidents of Jim's conduct which fit
the pattern; his failing memory and repetition (T-188, 189);
his difficulty in figuring interest on his insurance premium
(T-197); his inability to write to their sister in early November (T-191); and of course, the day downtown, November 26, 1956, when Jim was so bad, not remembering his
wife's name and not knowing where he was, that John immediately took him to see Dr. Walker (T-193, 194). All of
the family witnessed Jim's behavior on December 2, 1956
19
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when they took him for a ride during which he couldn't
remember the city of Murray and during the visit at his
brother Peter's house, where he appeared very restless and
uncommunicative, and failed to recognize his brother, Peter
(T-133, 171, 172, 198).
During this period from September through December
other old friends noticed that Jim was becoming nervous,
dull, and withdrawn. John Condas, a friend of 40 years, said
that in the late summer of 1956 Jim seemed very nervous and
couldn't sit still (T-118). Jim appeared to him to be depressed
and dispirited (T-117, 118).
John Pragastas, who had known Jim for 25 years, said
that Jim seemed different in the late summer and fall of 1956,
absent minded and broken in spirit (T-143). Mr. Pragastas
visited Jim on his name day, (St. James Day) October 26,
1956 with Jim's friends and relatives and supported their
statements that Jim withdrew himself completely from the
group and didn't say anything to his guests (T-145). Alke T.
Diamant, who also had known Jim as a friend for many years,
said that the last time he saw Jim in early November, 1956,
Jim seemed worried, as if he was under a tremendous strain
(T-158). Mrs. Jean Milligan, the deceased's landlady, reported
that Jim became less active in the fall of 1956 and didn't
go out as much as had been his custom. She said that Jim
seemed forgetful and didn't seem to rcognize her (T-178).
He forgot to pay his rent and when reminded thought it had
been paid. This was unusual for he had always been prompt
and had never forgotten before (T-179). Dr. Phil Howard
gave Jim a general physical examination on December 1, 1956,
20
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obtained a history from the defendant that Jim was becoming
forgetful and wandered into the wrong apartments (T-97).
Dr. Howard said that Jim Demiris appeared mentally dull
at the time and did not appear to comprehend the questions
that were addressed to him ( T -100) . The doctor therefore
suggested that they consult a neurologist for he thought the
patient had senile arterio-sclerosis ( T -100) . Frank Vlcek,
a tenant and neighbor in the Oakwood for six or seven years,
testified that Jim had told him about two months before he
was down in bed (December, 1956) that he wasn't feeling
good and that to him Jim "seemed different." Another
neighbor who had known Jim for 15 years, Mrs. Lenora
O'Connell, said that she visited Jim every day for a few
minutes and that he told her that he didn't feel good and
that he had acted and seemed sick two or three weeks before
he went to the hospital (T -206). She said that he had not
been as active for a month or six weeks before that time
(T-289) and that when he got sick he just seemed to give up
(T-290).
The defendant denied that Jim had any of the troubles
testified to by the other witnesses and claimed that the first
time she noticed anything wrong with her husband was after
Dr. Powell gave him "electricity for the brain." She admitted
that Jim may have been a little forgetful before this time
(T-16) but denied telling Dr. Howard that he had been
forgetful. She further denied telling Dr. Powell anything
about Jim's memory and claims she only said that Jim's eyes
and legs were troubling him (T-25). She claimed that Dr.
Powell told her that Jim was in a very good condition (T-27).
21
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Dr. Chester Powell, however, the only medical expert
who examined and treated Jim Demiris for his mental condition, testified completely to the contrary. Not only did Dr.
Powell state that the history obtained by him from the defendant and John Demiris was that Jim had been very forgetful
and confused for three weeks but he said that the defendant
had been in a very distraught state over her husband's condition and had told him that he had undergone changes, wasn't
himself, and that she was greatly concerned about him (T-63
and 64) . Mrs. Demiris had been so vehement about her
husband's changes that the doctor was skeptical of what she
said (T-77). During the time that the history was being taken
from the defendant and John Demiris, Jim Demiris had sat
quietly in the same room saying nothing. Dr. Powell then
gave Jim a complete neurological examination which included
an extensive interrogation of the patient to determine his
cerebration, speech, memory, orientation and other intellectual
capacities. Upon completion of the examination the doctor
concluded that he was suffering from acute senile mental
deterioration (T-67) and that he was incompetent for all
ordinary activities of life, being unable to communicate or
respond intelligently, with no ability to initiate physical or
mental activity on his own accord. He was not orientated in
space or time and his memory was grossly deficient (T-80).
In addition, he was unable to respond in an intelligent fashion
or exercise any degree of judgment (T-81). The doctor informed the defendant of his diagnosis together with the
prognosis that her husband would continue to get worse and
ultimately become a nursing problem (T-75).
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On December 21, 1956 the doctor was called to the
Demiris apartment where he found Jim Demiris totally disorientated, requiring immediate hospitalization ( T -77) . During
the time of the hospitalization the doctor reported that Jim
Demiris continued in a state of total disorientation with his
memory completely gone until his death on January 23, 1957
(T-77-78). Dr. Powell's diagnosis was confirmed by an
autopsy performed after Jim's death which revealed moderately
severe senile placques or nerve cell deterioration indicative
of senile dementia (T -79). When asked his opinion as to
how long the patient had been in a state of mental incompetency prior to December 18, 1956, when the doctor had first
seen him, Dr. Powell replied that it was his opinion given
with reasonable medical certainty that it was improbable and
medically quite unlikely that Jim Demiris had been competent
within a period of one to four months prior to December 18,
1956 (T-85).
In light of such convincing medical evidence, amply
supported as it was with lay-witnesses who described actiom
by Jim Demiris as early as September of 1956, which indicated
senile dementia, it is difficult to understand how the trial
court was not compelled to find that Jim Demiris was incompetent on December 5, 1956. However, a reading of the trial
court's memorandum decision rendered at the conclusion of
the case reveals that the court misinterpreted or misconstrued
completely Dr. Powell's testimony by the statement in the
decision regarding this testimony. It is submitted that Dr.
Powell, who gave the only medical testimony on competency,
was as positive and definite as a careful, qualified specialist
could be when he gave his considered opinion that Jim
23
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Derniris had been incompetent from one to four months prior
to December ~8. The admission on cross examination that
apparently so i~pressed the trial court that it was medically
"possible" for the patient's deterioration to have occurred in
a shorter period of time did not in any way balance or negative
the measured, calculated opinion of this specialist. The
defendant offered no medical testimony in rebuttal to Dr.
Powell, although she had Dr. Madison Thomas, another
neurosurgeon, present during all of Dr. Powell's testimony.
The defendant's witnesses, Dr. Diumenti and Dr. Callahan,
merely testified as to general observations as to the deceased's
appearance and actions like all of the other lay-witnesses,
including plaintiffs' witness Dr. Phil M. Howard.
The witnesses offered by the defendant, including her
old friends, Mrs. Bombas, Tiano and Tsimpoukis, did not
testify as to anything about Jim Derniris which they observed
that would be inconsistent with a condition of senile dementia.
They all merely claimed to have seen and talked with Jim
in November and December and that they remembered nothing
unusual about him. It should be noted that the testimony of
Mrs. Tiano and Mrs. Bombas clearly indicate that as good
freinds of the defendant their contacts with Jim would be
very casual and that during their visits they spent their time
conversing with the defendant and not Jim Demiris. The
volunteered testimony of defendant's other friends, Mrs.
Tsimpoukis and Mrs. Demas, that Jim and his wife never
fought causes their whole testimony to be viewed with skepticism in the face of the testimony of all other persons who
knew the Demirises or lived near them. Mrs. Demas's statement that Jim seemed all right until Dr. Powell gave him
24
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electricty for his brain also doesn't ring true for it was almost
in the identical language used to express the same contention
by the defendant (T-16). All of the testimony of the defendant's friends should be scrutinized carefully after Mrs.
Vlcek explained how the defendant asked her not to tell of
their fights and even how to express her denial ( T- 335) .
Dr. Powell made it abundantly clear that someone suffering from senile dementia is not a madman or a person with
a gross or unusual behaviour pattern but rather is someone
whose changes and complaints are of a very subtle and gradual
nature so that even those persons who have known him well
and had a good opportunity to observe his actions might only
recall some of the symptoms in retrospect (T-74). A person
incompetent from senile dementia can still talk, walk, and respond to simple situations or casual converstaion (Ex. D-9).
However, the gradual brain deterioration destroys the power to
plan, reason, remember or otherwise think clearly and independently. The testimony of Mrs. Tsimpoukis is a classic example of
this difficulty to observe these gradual changes in a person
suffering from senile dementia by a lay person. She testified
that even on December 19, 1956 when she saw Jim in his
apartment he recognized her and seemed all right except
for the fact that he claimed to see crowds of people outside
his window when no one was actually there (T-303, 304).
This was one day after Dr. Powell's initial examination
of December 18, 1956 when he found Jim "incompetent for
all ordinary activities of life" (T -80) and two days before
the doctor found him to be "totally disorientated" (T-77).
The difficulty in observing the symptoms of senile dementia
explains all of the testimony of the defendant's witnesses
25
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including the Doctors Diumenti and Callaghan and Mr. Floyd
Long of the First Security Bank. Mr. Long saw Jim Demiris
tQgether with his wife on December 10, 1956 when at the
apparent urging and prompting of the defendant (T-259, 263)
Jim Demiris told Mr. Long that he wished to have her name
placed on the checks that were sent to him "so she could cash
it and have some money if he was sick" (T-258). It is submitted that, while Jim Demiris may not have performed in
an unusual manner, this statement does not indicate a competent mental condition for if he had remembered and understood his actions of just five days before on December 5 in
signing the joint bank account cards with his wife, he would
have known that he thereby had given her access to some
$38,000.00.
In Maxon vs. Avery, supra, the California Supreme Court
held that the test of competency of an individual to create
a valid joint tenacy is whether such person actually understood the nature, purpose, and effect of what he did. This is
substantially the same test as is applied by the Utah courts
in determining whether a person had sufficient mental capacity
to make a Will. This Court In Re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah
580, 52 P (2) 1103, said at Page 1116:
''The true test is as to whether the testatrix had
sufficient mind and memory (at the time of making
the Will) to remember who \Yere the natural objects
of her bounty, recall to mind her property, and dispose of it understandingly, according to some plan
formed in her mind."
See also for a statement of this rule In Re Butters Estate, 123
Utah 603 261 P(2) 174.
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In Wells Fargo Bank v. Brady, 116 C.A. (2) 381, 254
P(2) 71, an action similar to the one at bar was brought by
the administrator of an estate to recover funds transferred
by the decedent· into joint tenancy accounts. The facts showed
that shortly before her death the decedent, accompanied by a
niece, called at four different banks and effected transfers
therein of her bank accounts from her individual name into
the names of the decedent, the niece, and the niece's daughter
as joint tenants. It was alleged that the deceased was of unsound mind at the time of the transfers and that undue
influence was asserted on her by her niece and her daughter.
The jury returned an advisory verdict in favor of the estate
and against joint tenants. This decision setting aside the
transfers into joint tenancy was affirmed upon appeal. This
case restated the rule announced in Maxom v. Avery, supra.
For other cases touching upon this question see In Re Ginsburg
Estate, 11 C.A. (2) 210, 53 P.(2) 397, and Olsen v. Washington, 18 C.A. (2) 85, 63 P(2) 304.

j;

The leading Utah case wherein mental incompetency
from senile dementia was an issue is the case of In Re Swan's
Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 P. 452. The contestants to the
deceased's Will contended that the deceased was afflicted
with senile dementia at the time he made his Last Will and
Testament and that the Will should not be permitted to stand.
While there was some medical testimony to this effect, the
doctors who testified had not seen the deceased for diagnosis
and treatment and merely gave their opinion based upon
casual observation and hypothetical questions. There was
considerable testimony presented by both sides from lay witnesses concerning their observations of the deceased and
27
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their opmron as to his mental condition. The judgment of
the trial court sustaining the Will was reversed in the Supreme
Court on the first hearing and upon reconsideration the Court
changed its opinion and affirmed the trial court's original
finding. The Court based its affirmance principally upon the
ground that the deceased made the will out himself, had his
attorney prepare it and then obtained three subscribing witnesses who were friends of his of long standing, men of sound
and discerning judgment, who all testified that at the time
he executed the Will he appeared sound and healthy. The
Court relied heavily upon the fact that deceased continued
to transact his business for several months after he had made
his Will. In that case the Court recognized that there was a
question as to whether or not the deceased actually had senile
dementia and that the medical testimony left this question
open. This, of course, is not the situation in the case presently
before this Court where the medical testimony that James
Demiris had senile dementia was made by a specialist whose
opinion was based upon his extensive examination and subsequent treatment which was later borne out by an autopsy.
Another distinction between the Swan case and the case
at bar is the fact that the Swan case was a law case and this
case is an equity case. In the Swan case the Court said that
it must, in considering the sufficiency of the evidence, be
limited to the consideration merely as to whether or not
there is substantial evidence to sustain the .findings. There are
numerous decisions from this Court which note the broader
views afforded by the appellate court in equity cases. In Jensen
v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034, this Court said that in
an equity case, the duty and responsibility of the Supreme
28
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Court is to rev1ew both questions of law and fact which in
effect is a trial de novo on the record. On such a review if
the Supreme Court is persuaded that a challenged finding is
against a fair preponderance or greater weight of the evidence,
or not supported by it, the Court should disapprove the finding
or direct another finding, or remand the case for further
proceedings. In Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 553 15 P(2)
1051, the Court said that in suits in equity the parties are entitled to review and determination by the Supreme Court on
questions of fact as well as questions of law but that the
findings made by the Trial Court should not be disturbed
unless the Supreme Court is convinced they are wrong; when
so convinced, however, it becomes the duty of the Supreme
Court to set them aside. This rule was repeated in Silver King
Consolidated Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297 39 P(2)
683, where it was held that the duty of the Supreme Court
in equity appeal was to examine the evidence, determine its
weight and reach its own conclusions with respect thereto.
A statutory definition of incompetency is found in Section 75-13-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which defines an
incompetent for the purpose of appointing a guardian as
follows:
"75-13-20. INCOMPETENT PERSONS - DEFINITIONS. The words 'incompetent,' 'mentally incompetent' and 'incapable,' as used in this title, shall be
construed to mean any person who, though not insane,
is, by reason of old age, disease, weakness of mind,
or from any other cause, unable, unassisted to properly
manage and take care of himself or his property, and
by reason thereof would be likely to be deceived or
imposed upon by artful or designing persons."
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We acknowledge our burden of establishing the incompetency of Jim Demiris by a preponderance of the evidence.
We submit that this was clearly done, and that the evidence
of incompetency was substantial and convincing, and as complete as possible in a case of a senile dementia where the
symptoms begin and death occurs within a period of some
five months. Is it probable or even reasonable to assume that
after manifesting the symptoms of senile dementia that James
Demiris did show for a three month period prior to December
5, 1956, that he was competent and of sound, disposing,
independent mind on that date, which was 13 days before
Dr. Powell found him incompetent for all ordinary purposes; and in light of the doctor's expert opinion stated with
reasonable 1nedical certainty that Jim Demiris had been incompetent from one to four months before December 18, 1956.
It is respectfully submitted that after a careful examination
of all of the evidence in this case this Court will be compelled
to conclude that the trial court was in error and that a finding
should be made that James C. Demiris was incompetent on
December 5, 1956, and that the joint accounts created on
that day should be set aside.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE DEFENDANT EXERCISED UNDUE INFLUENCE AND DOMINATED HER HUSBAND IN THE
CREATION OF THE JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS IN DECEMBER OF 1956.
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Direct evidence as to undue influence is rarely obtainable
and hence a Court must determine the issue of undue influence
by inferences drawn from all the facts and circumstances.
Taken singly the facts and circumstances may be of little
weight, but taken collectively they acquire their proper weight
and may then be sufficient in raising a presumption or sustaining a finding of undue influence. Wells Fargo Bank v.
Brady, 116 C.A. (2) 381, 254 P. (2) 71.
The evidence revealed that James C. Demiris during his
lifetime was a frugal, hard-working man who had been successful in his business affairs. He was able to read and write
the English language, and had a good command of English.
He had a close relationship with both of his brothers here in
America, John and Peter, socially and in a business way, and
he joined with them in helping their less fortunate brothers
and sister in Greece. The evidence showed that whenever the
deceased had independent advice or expressed his desires and
intentions away from the presence and influence of his wife,
he indicated that he wanted each of his brothers and sister
to share in his estate, and made provision for them in his
Wills.
While the deceased had a friendly relationship with his
brothers and sister, he had a very unhappy marriage with the
defendant, filled with quarrels and fights over money and
her desire to get him back to Greece (T -106, 117, 129, 142,
154, 161, 177, 186, 289). The defendant returned without
her husband to Greece on two occasions during their 31 years
of marriage, and stayed on those occasions approximately 13
years ( T -168) . The marital troubles existed during most of
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their married life together, and became so serious on two occasions, one in 1951 and the other in the year before he died,
that her husband consulted attorneys concerning a divorce
from the defendant (T-117,154). While Mrs. Demiris contended that they had a happy marriage without quarrels and
fights, and that at no time did they consider divorce (T-8, 9,
11), Mr. E. R. Callister, Jr., testified that in 1951 the defendant
and her husband were separated for over a month's time and
that during this period he conducted divorce negotiations on
Jim's behalf with the defendant or her counsel, Mr. N. J.
Cotro-lvianes, and at Jim's request offered the defendant
$10,000.00 to leave her husband (T-117). In the fall of
1956 James Demiris consulted Mr. Alke T. Diamant, another
attorney, and requested his advice on a divorce from his wife.
He told Mr. Diamant that his life with her was intolerable
and that he would be willing to give her as much as $40,00.00
to leave him (T. 154). He expressed to Mr. Diamant his
fear that his wife's family might poison him and get all his
money. Jim said that he wanted his brothers and sister to
share in his estate and that he wanted Mr. Diamant to check
over his Will that Mr. Callister had prepared to be sure that
they would get a share when he died ( T. 15 5) .
Jim confided about his marital troubles on a number
of occasions with his old friend, John Pragastis, and in August
or September of 1956 told him that his life with his wife
was unbearable and that the only thing to do was to obtain
a divorce (T. 142). The incident related by Mr. Ted Jouflas
of how he had seen the defendant and her husband downtown
in the summer of 1956 is significant. He heard them arguing
in Greek over Jim's money. The defendant was swearing at
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Jim in a very profane way and said to him that he didn't have
much longer to go and when he died she would get his money
(T. 161-162). The defendant admitted to Mrs. Frank Vlcek
in the late summer of 1956 that she and her husband had
been fighting over his money and that she had offered to
leave him for $60,000.00 (T. 150).
There was considerable evidence from which an inference
could be drawn that the defendant exercised undue influence
over her husband and dominated him. The story reported by
Jim's attorney, E. R. Callister, Jr., as to how the three wills
were dra\vn in March of 1952 clearly indicated her efforts
to dominate Jim in his affairs. The first will drawn by Mr.
Callister at Jim's request provided specific bequests for his
four brothers and one sister of $5,000.00 each. The following
week Jim returned with his wife and had a new will drawn
which cut out entirely his two brothers here in Salt Lake City,
Peter and John, and reduced the bequests to the two brothers
and one sister jn Greece to $1,000.00, giving all of the balance
to his wife, and in the event of her prior death, equally divided
his estate between his family and defendant's family. The
very next day James Demiris returned alone to Mr. Callister's
office and advised him that the Will drawn the day before had
been made solely to appease his wife, and he thereupon directed
drawn the Will that was admitted to probate, leaving bequests
of $10,000.00 each to his four brothers and one sister, the
balance to his wife, and in the event of her prior death, all
of his estaate to be divided equally between the Intervenors
(T-105). Dr. Howard testified that at the time he examined
Jim Demiris on December 1, his wife dominated the situation
and answered all of the questions thta he directed to Jim
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(T-100). Mr. Pragastis told how on Jim's name day, October
26, 1956, when Jim tried to speak, defendant became angry
at him and Jim became "petrified" and remained silent (T-146).
The defendant denied having known of Jim's bank accounts prior to December 5, 1956, and stated that she had no
knowledge of the effect of a joint account (T-34). She
claimed she had never questioned anyone about such accounts
(T-39). Frank Vleck, however, testified that about December
2nd or 3rd, 1956, the defendant c3;_me to his apartment in the
Oakwood with an American Savings Bank Book of an account
in Jim's name alone, containing $10,000.00, and asked him
if she would be able to withdraw the money. He said he told
her that it would be necessary for her to have her name on
it before she could withdraw the funds (T-56). Mr. Alke
Diamant also stated that Mrs. Demiris had questioned him
about joint accounts and he had advised her concerning them
(T. 156-157). Is it not significant that right after obtaining
this information, that she now denies obtaining, she went
with her husband to every bank in which he had an account
in his own name and the accounts were made joint? It i5
submitted that these continual fights, quarrels and difficultie5
over money had their effect upon Jim so that when he was in
a weakened mental condition, confused, frightened and disturbed, and at a time when, in the words of Mrs. O'Connell,
he just seemed to give up, his wife finally succeeded in forcing him to give over to her the control of all his assets. That
there was trouble and pressures to which Jim was subjected
and from which he tried without avail to escape is evident
from the incident related by Frank Vleck, which occurred in
early December. He observed the defendant chasing after Jim
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down stairs of the apartment. Defendant said to him, "He
wants to go outside. He is crazy." Whereupon Jim pulled his
fist back as if to strike her and said, "She is too smart" ( T- 55) .
Such facts certainly establish more than mere suspicious
circumstances, requiring careful appraisal by the Court. This
is particularly true in light of the defendant's subsequent conduct jn hurriedly withdrawing all of the accounts and cashing
the United States Savings Bonds, thereby reducing to her
possession the sum of some $82,000.00, the bulk of her husband's estate, while he was in a hospital in a state of complete
incompetency. Dr. Powell testified that persons suffering from
senile dementia are notoriously easily influenced and made
the following comment which we submit is recognized by the
courts:
"These people suffering from this contition (senile
dementia) are often victimized by others who take
advantage of their inability to exercise proper judgment and, I am sure, most attorneys and judges have
seen cases previously where problems come up of this
sort."

(A) The defendant had the burden of proving a lack
of undue influence because of her confidential relationship as wife of the deceased, together with the facts and
circumstances indicating that she had taken advantage of
him by the creation of the joint accounts shortly before
her husband's death and in opposition to his declared
intentions and the provisions of his Last Will, and the
defendant failed in meeting this burden.
It is submitted that the law recognizes a confidential
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relationship exists between a man and his wife. This Court
In Re Bryan's Estate, 82 Ut. 390, 25 P(2) 602, stated:
"The influence over a testator of one who is his wife,
child guardian attorney spiritual advisor, or who occupi;s ·some o;her confide1;tial relation to him is not
necessarily undue influence although it may, when
coupled with other circumstances, raise a presumption
of undue influence."
In Glover v. Glover, 121 Ut. 362, 242 P(2) 298, a divorce
proceeding, this Court again recognized the confidential relationship betwen a husband and his wife.
Another case involving a husband and wife was the case
of Miller v. Livingston, 31 Utah 415 88 P. 338. In this case the
wife was the sole beneficiary under her husband's will which
she had procured and given instructions as to its terms. The
Court held that while there was no presumption of undue
influence, the relationship was such as to raise a suspicion
requiring vigilance of the Court. While In Re Swan's Estate,
4 Ut. (2) 277, 293 P(2) 682, expressly overruled both Miller
v. Livingston and In Re Bryan's Estate to the effect of the
presumption of undue influence and the burden of persuasion
with respect thereto, these cases are still good authority for
the proposition \hat there is a confidential relationship existing between a husband and wife. Another Utah case concerning the question of undue influence between persons in the
same family is the case of Jardine vs. Archibald, 3 Utah 2d
88, 279 P(2) 454, wherein it was determined that a confidential relationship existed between a mother and her son
and daughter and that the burden was on the son and daughter
36

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to prove that they did not unduly influence their mother in
her making gifts to them.
There are a number of reported cases from the California
Appellate Courts involving this question of undue influence
between a husband and wife. Dale v. Dale, 87 C.A. 359, 262 P.
339 is a leading case cited a number of times by the California
courts. In that case the District Court of Appeals held:
"In transactions between a husband and wife the
rule with respect to confidential relations restrains and
precludes either from obtaining an unfair advantage
of the other through fraud, mistake, or undue influence.
Such transactions are considered subject to the rules
which effect the relationship of trustee and beneficiary,
their relationship is, in fact, presumed to be confidential (citations) and where either obtains an advantage
over the other, the transaction is presumed to have
been without adequate consideration, and to have been
secured through undue influence, and the burden is then
upon him who had the advantage to show that it was
fair and free from fraud and undue influence."
Morris v. Berman, 159 C.A. (2) 770, 324 P(2) 601
cited with approval the rule recited in Dale v. Dale and held
that if the wife unduly profits or gains an advantage by reason
of her confidential relationship, that a presumption of undue
influence arises. These cases, while recognizing the confidential relationship and the influence of a wife admittedly, do
not hold that such influence is presumed to be undue unless
it appears from the particular transaction that the marital
confidence was used to take advantage or that the confidence
was subsequently violated. See Morris v. Berman, supra.
In 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Section 956 et seq., the
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author restates the rule that there is a confidential relationship
between a husband and wife, and reports where it appears
that the wife was in a superior or stronger position, the presumption of undue influence applies to her. The author said:
"In every transaction between them by which the
superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity raises
a presumption against its validity and casts upon that
party the burden of proving affirmatively compliance
with equitable requisites and of thereby overcoming
the presumption."
This court In Re Swan's Estate, 293 P (2) 682 at Page 691,
cited the above Section of Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence
with approval.
In 26 Am. Jur., Page 876, Paragraph 268, Husband and
Wife, it is reported:
"The relationship of husband and wife is generally
regarded as a confidential nature. In many jurisdictions,
particularly the community property jurisdictions, statutes expressly provide that transactions between them
shaH be subject to the general law governing transactions between persons in a confidential relationship.
If there is any misrepresentations or any concealment
of material facts, or any just suspicion of artifice or
undue influence, courts of equity will interpose and
pronounce the transaction void and as far as possible
restore the parties to their original rights. Equity will
enforce agreements between the spouses only where
they are fair and just and free from fraud, undue influence, duress and overeaching."
Paragraph 270 on Page 878 deals specifically with the protection of the husband and reports the law to be as follows:
"Equity will, in general, relieve a husband from his
38
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contracts with, or conveyance or transfer, to his wife,
obtained by her fraud, undue influence, overreaching
of him, etc., by means of her confidential relation with
him, especially where the circumstances are such that
the husband is so dependent on the wife and so aged
and weak in mind and body that he may easily be
subjected to her undue influence, overeaching, etc.; and
in such a situation, it has been held, a conveyance or
transfer from him to her will not be sustained or enforced without affirmative proof that his act was intelligently done without undue influence. Hence, if a
wife by fraud and imposition on her huband induces
him voluntarily to transfer property to her or for her
benefit, a court of equity will afford him relief and
compel a reconveyance."
For other authorities to this effect see Peyton v. Peyton Corporation et al, 7 Atl. 2d 737, 123 A.L.R. 1482; Barker v.
Barker, 27 N.W. 2d 576, 171 A.L.R. 447, and 56 L.R.A. 817.
While the evidence in this case discloses that the defendant and her deceased husband had continuing marital
difficulties and that he had never given her control or a share
in any of his estate, which was a cause of marital friction,
it is clear from the facts that they lived together as man and
wife in a small apartment during some 18 years of their
married life. It is evident that there must have been between
them, as in the case of any two married people living together,
a relationship requiring certain trust and confidence. Thi~
became even more necessary when in the last few months of
Jim Demiris' life his health failed; he began having trouble
with his eyes, his legs, his memory, and his mental processes,
thereby of necessity having to rely more and more for assistance upon the defendant. After November 26, 1956, Jim
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Demiris never left their apartment except in her company,
and he was never thereafter seen alone by his friends or
relatives. While her husband was in such a condition of dependence and disability, the defendant took him to each of
his banks where portions of his estate were located in various
savings accounts, and made certain that these accounts were
placed under her control and made readily accessible to her.
Shortly thereafter she obtained all of her husband's funds
and assets, thereby completely wiping him out with the exception of his interest in the note and mortgage being collected
by the First Security Bank, at a time when he was helpless
in the hospital. These transactions, giving defendant control
and possession of the estate, were in direct opposition and
conflict to the decedent's Will and the intentions previously
expressed by him on all reported occasions, namely, that he
did not wish his wife to have all of his money, and that it
was his desire to have his brothers and sister share in his
estate. It is respectfully ubmitted that under these facts, it
clearly appears that the defendant took unfair advantage of
the marital confidence and dependency of her husband and
subsequently violated this confidence. Under such circumstances, the burden of persuasion should be cast upon her,
who obtained this unfair advantage, to show it was fair and
free from fraud and undue influence. In Re Swan's Estate,
supra.
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Hartman v. Strickler,
82 Virginia 255, said:
"Wherever a Will executed by an old man differs
from his previously expressed intentions and is made in
favor of those \vho stand in relation of confidence or
40
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dependence toward him, it raises a violent presumption of fraud and undue influence which should be
overcome by satisfactory testimony."
See also Olsen v. Washington, 18 C.A.(2) 85 63 P(2) 304,
where it was held that where there is an old person, broken in
health and worn down mentally so that her actions may readily
be influenced by those in whom she had confidence, and it appears that one who has her confidence emerges with a goodly
price for which no consideration was given, an inference arises,
capable of sustaining a finding that undue influence has been
used.
The only explanation that can be offered for the trial
Court's finding on the undue influence question in this case is
that instead of having a confidential relationship determined,
because of the facts and circumstances, thereby shifting the
burden of persuasion to the defendant, the Trial Court clothed
the defendant, because she was decedent's wife, with a presumption of innocence that was irrebutable.
The defendant failed completely in sustaining any burden,
for she introduced no evidence whatever to indicate that the
transaction creating the joint tenancies on December 5, 1956,
was without fraud or undue influence on her part. Her only
statement with respect to these matters was that her husband
early that morning had said to her that he remembered something and then took her downtown without further explanation to change these accounts. That this is unlikely is manifest,
particularly in the light of the fact that the defendant was
thoroughly impeached concerning her testimony that she and
her husband never fought, that he was perfectly well until
Dr. Powell put electricity in his brain, that she did not tell
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Dr. Howard nor Dr. Powell that her husband was sick or that
his memory was failing, that she did not inquire about the
bank accounts, etc. It should also be noted that the defendant
did not even testify in her own defense, and the only evidence
obtained from her was by interrogation as an adverse witness
as part of the plaintiff's case.

(B) Should this Court determine that the relationship of the defendant and her deceased husband and the
circumstances of the transfers were not such as to create
a presumption of undue influence against the defendant,
so that the burden of proof remained with the parties
urging such undue influence, it is respectfully submitted
that this burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence was clearly and convincingly met.

There are a number of cases that have been decided by
this court on the question of undue influence, most of which
were reviewed in the second Swan case, supra. Such a case
is In Re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Ut. 253, 248 P(2) 372. In
this case this Court held that mere opportunity, interest, confidential relationship, or weakened physical condition of the
testator held no presumption of undue influence, but that
these factors or combination of them do provide fertile
ground for the exercise of such influence, and where they
exist the Court is under a duty to carefully scrutinize the facts
and circumstances relating to the execution of the Will in
question. Taking the factors recognized in the Lavelle case
as providing fertile ground for the exercise of undue influence
and applying them to the evidence in this case, we have the
following:
42
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1. Weakened physical condition-The testimony clearly

showed that James Demiris was slipping physically and mentally prior to December 5, 1956. The fact that his relatives had
insisted on two occasions, November 26, 1956 and December
l, 1956, that Jim go to a doctor clearly shows that something
seemed wrong with him at the time. His wife's declarations
to Drs. Howard and Powell before any litigation resulted
as to her husband's difficulties and condition are especially
significant. On December 1 she told Dr. Howard that Jim
was having trouble with his legs, that he was forgetful and
wandered into other people's apartment. The doctor reported
that Jim appeared mentally dull and did not seem to answer
or comprehend his questions. The defendant was so distraught
over her husband's condition on December 18 that Dr. Powell
tended to discount some of her statements regarding her
husband's changes. She reported at that time that Jim had
been very forgetful and confused for over three weeks and
there were other noticeable changes in his behavior. Dr.
Powell, on the 18th, found Jim to be incompetent for all
ordinary activities. This was only 13 days after the purported
transfers of the accounts on December 5. In addition there
was all of the other testimony of the friends and relatives as
to Jim's changes and failing condition since September of
1956.
2. Opportunity - The defendant, as the wife of the
deceased, spent more time with him and had a closer relationship than any other person. She was alone with him every
night, and after November 26, 1956, Jim Demiris was never
out of her presence to obtain any independent advice or help
from other people.
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3. Interest or Motive-By her own admissions the defendant had no money or estate of her own. The testimony
indicated quarrels over an extended period of time concerning
finances and her desire to get her husband and his money back
to Greece. It was obvious in December of 1956, seven years
after Jim Demiris had retired in 1949, that she was never
going to realize her desire of living in Greece so long as her
husband remained alive. Thus, she must wait until his death
to go back to her homeland. She had never been given
control or possession of any of her husband's bank accounts
or other assets and must have been aware, because of his many
declarations and his prior Wills, of his desire to leave part
of his estate to his brothers and sister. Her questioning of
Alke Diamant and Frank Vlcek concerning her husband's
bank b )oks and how she would be able to withdraw them,
clearly showed her schemes and desires to reduce all of his
assets to her possession. It is significant that she guiltily denied
these facts testified to by these disinterested witnesses.
What then are the probabilities? Is it probable that after
a marital history of separation, divorce consultations, constant
quarreling and fights, Jim Demiris suddenly, independently
and contrary to his clearly expressed intentions changed his
mind and freely and voluntarily gave to his wife practically
everything he owned? Is it probable in light of the close relationship and affection that Jim had with his brothers and
sister and the concern he felt for the three less fortunate
members of his family in Greece, particularly the sick sister
to whom he was sending money as late as November of 1956,
that less than qne month later he would cut her off too-ether
'
b
with his brothers, from any interest in his estate? Is it not
44

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

obvious from all the evidence that when Jim was in a weak,
enfeebled and frightened condition, caused by his physical
and mental failing; that he finally succumbed to the continuous
pressures and threats that had been asserted against him, and
because of defendant's undue influence, changed his habitual
control of his money?
It is respectfully submitted that the circumstantial evidence
m this case is so strong and irresistable as to require the
conclusion that the action of the decedent, James Demiris, in
creating the joint accounts on December 5, 1956 was the result
of a weakened mental condition that was taken unfair ad-

vantage of by the defendant.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 'THE
DECEASED INTENDED TO MAKE A GIFT TO THE
DEFENDANT OF MONIES IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS
AND U. S. SAVINGS BONDS IN THE ABSENCE OF
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AS TO THAT
FACT.
Under Utah law, one claiming a gift of an interest in a
bap.k account against the estate of a decedent "takes upon
himself a heavy burden, which he must support by evidence
of great probative force, which clearly establishes every
element of a valid gift," Christensen v. Ogden State Bank,
75 Ut. 478, 286 P. 638. See also Holman v. Deseret Savings
Bank, 41 Utah 340, 124 P. 765. The joint form of the account
creates no presumption that a joint tenancy or gift was 11145
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tended, Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, supra; Boyle v.
Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 P. 136; Olson v. Scott, 61 Utah
42, 210 P. 987. These rulings follow the law concerning
other gift situations where the claimant of an inter vives
gift bears the burden of proving the gift by clear and convincing evidence, Lovett v. Continental Bank, 4 Utah 2d 76,
286 P. 2d 106 5, and showing a clear and unmistakable intention on the part of the donor to mak~ a gift, Jones v. Cook,
118 Utah 562, 233 P.2d 423.
However, if two persons sign a joint account card, prepared by the bank for its own protection but purporting to
establish rights between the signatories, they are said to have
"entered a contract," Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364; 39 P.2d
715, and the courts are bound by the agreement, First Security
Bank v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 P.2d 297, despite the fact
that no consideration is given by one of the parties.

If the words used on the particular bank's form deposit
cards warrant it, a presumption arises that joint tenancy was
intended, which presumption must be rebutted by "clear and
convincing proof'' if both parties are alive at time of suit,
Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P.2d 327. If the account
is to be partitioned, it is presumed that each of the parties
owns one-half of the amount on deposit, despite the fact
that either has the power to withdraw all, Greener v. Greener,
116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194.
The greatest difficulty with the Utah cases, however,
occurs when one of the two parties to the joint deposit dies.
Then the presumption becomes conclusive and no proof may
be entered by his heirs of an intent other than that expressed
46
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in the bank-prepared deposit card, according to Holt v. Bayles,
supra. In the most recent case in this area, Greener v .. Greener,
supra, Justice Wade, in special concurrence, pointed out that
the cases create a confusion of burdens of proof, each side
requiring clear and convincing evidence, since the money
could only pass by virtue of a gift if there is no consideration
in the agreement of deposit. He is able to reconcile the cases
into two lines of authority with the exception of Holt v. Bayles:

( 1) a contract situation with consideration passing requiring
clear and convincing evidence on the part of the original
owner to overcome the terms of his contract, ( 2) a gift situation, regardless of the bank-drawn instrument, requiring the
donee to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
gift was made.
Also in Greener v. Greener, Justice Wolfe, writing the
majority opinion, expressed some concern over the court-made
rule that the expression of intent found in the bank cards is
conclusive upon the heirs of the deceased depositor. He suggests that the court has gone astray by following cases decided
in states having a statute creating a conclusive presumption
and providing a form which will evoke this presumption, (see
annotations at 103 A.L.R. 1133; 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy,
sec. 3 ( 2) p. 922), but a consideration of this point was not
necessary to the disposition of Greener v. Greener.

i:

Sin~e all of the evidence received by the court shows
no gift was intended and only the language of the bank account
cards stand to support Mrs. Demiris' claim of a gift, as discussed in Point IV, infra, appellants conclude that the trial
court must have applied a conclusive presumption adverse to
them.
47
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A. The Appellants Urge a Reconsideration of the Holding in the Misfit Holt v. Bayles case.

The Utah Joint Deposits Statute, U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-45, is
unlike statutes such as that of New York discussed in Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506, 66 A.L.R. 871,
in that it provides no guide as to what type of language will
create a joint tenancy or shift the burden of proof in an instance
of adverse claims. In fact, the statute is not concerned at all
with the relationship between the depositors but seeks merely
to protect the bank in paying out money to either of them.
Apparently both Neill v. Royce and Holt v. Bayles considered
the New York Moskowitz case as supporting the application
of the conclusive presumption, but the headnote of the Moskowitz case annotated at 66 A.L.R. 871 reads:
"Independently of statute, a savings bank deposit
made by one person to the credit of herself and another 'payable to either or the survivor of them' and
the delivery of the pass book to the latter would have
been insufficient either to establish an intention to
make a gift or to effectuate a delivery of the subject
matter of a gift."
In arriving at the anomalous conclusion that the alleged
donee was relieved of the burden of showing a gift to her
and that the expression contained in the bank deposit card was
conclusive, Holt v. Bayles distinguishes the cases of Holman
v. Deseret Savings Bank, Olson v. Scott, Boyle v. Dinsdale
and Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, all cited supra, in that
they "turned on the question of whether or not there was a
gift inter vivos, not whether there had been the creation of
a joint ownership with right of survivorship." Of this theory
48

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

imposed by some courts, the annotation in L.R.A. 1917C. 551
states:
"It is believed that such a theory rests upon a misconception of the real nature of the question or contest.
It must be remembered that the contest in the cases at
hand is between the estate of the original owner and
the survivor . . . in other words, property that admittedly belonged to one person at a former time is
claimed by another who does not pretend to have
parted with any valuable consideration therefor. If the
contest were between the depositors ~nd the bank, it
might be true that the depositors, even the one other
than the original owner, could stand on the contractual
relation created by the deposit in this form, or that
the bank, having paid the fund to the one other than
the original owner, might defend an action by the
original owner on the ground that it had complied
with its contract in such payment. But the real contest
is not between the depositors and the bank-the bank
is a mere stakeholder; the contest is in substance or
effect between the depositors themselves. In such a
case, either a gift or a trust is a condition precedent
to any question arising under the tenancy created by
such a deposit."

At 7 Am. Jur., Banks, Sec. 426 (b) it is said:
"The question of joint tenancy is also subsequent! y
discussed; there are a number of statutes creating this
relationship betwen the co-depositors, but as a general
thing, and apart from statute, the better considered
cases regarded such a relation as a secondary one that
results from a gift or trust."
In the absence of a statutory provision establishing the
rights of the depositors between themselves, it is generally
~ held that questions presented as to the ownership of the fund

uu:
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must be determined in the light of common law principles
under the circumstances attending the deposit. In that determination, the intention of the depositor is a primary and controlling factor. 48 A.L.R. 190; 66 A.L.R. 881; 103 A.L.R.
1123; Kittredge v. Manning, 317 Mass. 689, 59 N.E. 2d 261;
Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W. 2d 834.
The difficulty of concluding the intention of the depositor
from the language of the deposit card, where there is no
guiding statute, is amply demonstrated in the present case.
Here we have a wide diversity of language on the various
cards, even those signed on the same day apparently under the
same circumstances. Some create an interest in Mrs. Demiris
under the theory of the Holt case; the cards on the Continental
Bank accounts create no interest under that law, and another,
American Savings & Loan Association Trust Account, purports to create an interest in her estate after her death. If
the language of the latter account card is to be strictly construed without regard to the requirements of an inter vivos
gift, the institution profits by the continuation of the deposit
but both reason and the evidence indicate that such was not
the intention of either Mr. Demiris or Mrs. Demiris on the
day they signed it.
The cards demonstrate the vanous vtews of the banks
as to their obligations to their clients, the banks' desire to
protect themselves in accordance with U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-45,
and the skill or lack of skill of their attorneys, but they demonstrate little of the intention of the parties entering the socalled agreement. This is the danger of applying a conclusive
presumption in the absence of a definitive statute.
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The rule of Holt v. Bayles creates a conflict in the burdens
of proof. The clear and convincing proof required in all other
gift situations, regardless of whether the donee, having obtained possession, is sued as defendant or brings suit against
the estate, Lovett v. Continental Bank, supra, is effectively
and completely destroyed where a counter conclusive presumption (apparently a substantive rule of law) is applied in this
area. A presumption might arise in the donee's favor upon
the introduction of the joint account cards, but only if that
presumption is made conclusive will the presumptions conflict
under the Thayer and Wigmore view of presumptions.
The donee primarily meets the burden of producing the
joint account cards and the donor's estate must thence take
on the burden of showing an intent other than that expressed
in the cards. If it does so, and the donee fails to convincingly
rebut this evidence, then the decision must be for the donor
and against the donee .
. "Presumptions are sometimes spoken of as 'conflicting'. But~ in the sense above examined, presumptions do not conflict. The evidentiary facts, free from
any rule of law as to the duty of producing evidence,
may tend to opposite inferences, which may be said
to conflict. But the rule of law which prescribes this
duty of production either is or is not at a given time
upon a given party. If it is, and he removes it by producing contrary evidence, then that presumption, as a
rule of law, is satisfied and disappears; he may then
by his evidence succeed in creating another presumption which now puts the same duty upon the other
party . . . " IX Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2492, p.
292. See also I d. Sec. 2491 ( 3) p. 290.
Michigan, which has a statute creating a presumption
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of a gift, has held that the presumption has no weight as
evidence when challenged by rebutting testimony, National
Bank of Detroit v. Schirmer, 303 Mich. 598, 6 N.W. 2d 908;
Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W. 2d 834.
It is submitted that the state of the evidence in the present
case, as discussed in Point IV, infra, is such as to reinvest
Mrs. Demiris with the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence the gift of the money in the accounts, if the
conclusiveness of the presumption of the Holt case is overruled, as it is believed it should be. With the continuing
burden of persuasion upon the defendant the decision should
have been for appellants as to all the bank accounts and bonds.

B. Even if the Holt Case is Followed, the Trial Court
Erred in Applying a Conclusive Presumption to Funds
Withdrawn from the Accounts Prior to the Death of
the True Owner.
Nirs. Demiris withdrew all of the money in all of the
accounts, with the exception of the American Savings & Loan
trust account which she could not obtain, and cashed all of
the U. S. Savings Bonds after her husband had been hospitalized as incompetent, but before his death. Even those states
having statutory authority for applying a conclusive presump·
tion apply that presumption only to the survivorship feature
of the accounts, Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, supra,
and not to money withdrawn during the lifetime of the true
owner. As is stated in 161 A.L.R. 86:
"It may be noted that where the act of one in open·
ing with his own funds a bank account in the names
of himself and another, with formal authority in either
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to draw, does not under the particular circumstances
constitute a gift of any interest, the act of such other
in withdrawing all of the money in the lifetime of
both parties not only does not destroy the rights of
the owner, but under the New York, and similar
statutes, the drawer by such act will be prevented from
acquiring title as survivor. Under such statutes the
withdrawal renders proof of the true ownership competent notwithstanding the death of the owner, which
proof, had the money been left in the account, would
have been excluded by reason of the statutory presumption of joint ownership becoming conclusive on such
death."
Under the theory of almost all of the cases reported in that
annotation, beginning at page 66, "the question whether one
of the parties to a joint account, empowered, as to the bank,
to withdraw all the money, may rightfully do so as to the
other party, and whether, having made a total withdrawal,
he may apply the money to his personal use without liability
to the other, is, ordinarily, under the prevailing doctrine,
the mere question whether the withdrawer is the true owner
... "p. 75.
Thus, the evidence in the present case should have been
; considered in its entirety, giving the form of the cards only
r;:
that weight due it in all the circumstances of the case.
r~
I~

POINT IV

IF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IS CREATED BY
ANY DEPOSIT CARDS THAT DECEASED INTENDED
n· TO MAKE A GIFT TO DEFENDANT PLAINTIFFS OVER:~ CAME SUCH PRESUMPTION BY CLEAR AND CONnf VINCING EVIDENCE.
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Since aU of the evidence, including that of defendant,
shows that the deceased had three concerns for the money
which he had accumulated over the years, ( 1) that his brothers
and sister receive according to the will, ( 2) that Mrs. Demiris'
family get none of .it, and ( 3) that if he became too ill to
manage his affairs that his bills would be paid, the presumption
of a gift to Mrs. Demiris of the money destined to pay out his
bequests and administer his estate without cost to his specific
legatees is at odds with his oft-expressed intent. It is to be
noted that Mrs. Demiris, as residuary legatee and insurance
beneficiary, is well provided for even if the terms of the will
are enforced.
1. A gift by joint account is contrary to his numerous wills.
He well knew how to handle the disposition of his money in
the event of his death and sought to do so, despite Mrs.
Demiris' interference ( T -105, 109, 15 5) .
2. Mrs. Demiris was not the natural reap1ent of his
bounty. Although Mr. Demiris was aware of a duty owing to
his wife and sought to discharge it by leaving her the greater
portion of his estate, he felt no typical marital affection for
her and sought to pay her to divorce him (T-106, 107, 154).
They quarrelled frequently ( T -149, 177, 289). He feared her
(T-144). They spent almost half of their married life apart.

3. Mrs. Demiris did not use any of the money in the joint
accounts until she was aware of the facts of his impending
, death, although she complained that he was stingy (T-104)
and wanted money to go back to Greece (T-75). Nor did she
cash the bonds until December, 1956, and January, 1957,
(T-40) (Ex. P-22).
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4. Mrs. Demiris showed her guilty knowledge that no
gift was intended by withdrawing all the money in their joint
names immediately after his being hospitalized in an incompetent state (Ex. P-10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22).
5. Mrs. Demiris again demonstrated guilty knowledge by
stating in her deposition that the bonds had been cashed
prior to December, 1956, when in fact she herself cashed them
after that time (T-41) (Ex. P-42).
6. J\1r. Demir is stated that his intent was to arrange
matters so that Mrs. Demiris would be able to receive and
cash the checks from the payments on the note in case of his
illness (T-258).
7. The testimony of defendant's witness, Mrs. Demas,
indicates that the reason for the December 5 changes in the
accounts was to provide a means whereby Mrs. Demiris could
take care of Mr. Demiris if he was ill, (T-333) and even
Mrs. Tsimpoukis only testified that one of the two had stated
"that he had changed the books" (T-293).

:s

8. Mrs. Demiris inquired of a disinterested witness how
she could withdraw money from the bank accounts just prior
to the time the last accounts were made joint on December
5 (T-56).

9. Mrs. Demiris harrassed the deceased by telling him
she would get all of his money when he was dead regardless
~ of his desires (T. 162).

nti

T
~

10. Regardless of whether Mr. Demiris was incompetent
on December 5 or not, he was obviously a sick man, for he
died on January 23. After a lifetime of protecting his money
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from his wife the most reasonable conclusion is that the
'
change at that date was made for business convenience.
Additionally, it appears that there was no inter vivos
gift as to the first four joint accounts, including the checking
account at Walker Bank, which all were established some
time prior to December 5, 1956, and which totaled $34,641.99
(Ex. P-10, P-12, P-15, Pretrial Order 3, par. f), for Mrs.
Demiris stated that she had no knowledge as to their existence (T-34). Although the contract with the bank may be
sufficient substitute for the formalities of a gift in ordinary
circumstances, the act of the alleged donor in preventing
knowledge by the donee that she had the power to withdraw
the funds would negative a presumption that he intended
an immediate! y effective gift. The most that could be said
of his intention under such circumstances was that he intended
a gift to take effect upon his death, which gift would be void
as violative of the Statute of Wills.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
DEPOSIT CARDS ON THE TWO CONTINENTAL BANK
ACCOUNTS GRANTED ANY INTEREST THEREIN TO
THE DEFENDANT.
The deposit cards of the two Continental Bank accounts
evidence no donative intent whatsoever, and fall within the
exception of Greener v. Greener, supra.
The Continental Bank cards create no survivorship in·
terest and provide only that the bank has discharged its
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obligation by paying to either of the depositors. In Greener
v. Greener, supra, it is said: "If there is no agreement between
the parties which has been reduced to writing, the only documentary evidence being the form of the deposit (e.g. 'in
account with A or B' with no provision concerning survivorship), the intent of the owner in converting the account to
a joint one must be shown by extrinsic evidence as there is no
presumption that a 'joint tenancy' or gift was intended."
The entire language of the two cards signed by Mr. and
Mrs. Demiris with the Continental Bank, Ex. P-12 and P-13,
reads merely:
"Below find duly authorized signatures, either of
which you will recognize in payment of funds from
this account, or the transaction of other business in
connection with the account.
"The sums deposited to this account are, and those
sums hereafter to be deposited shall be payable to either
of us or to the survivor of us; and we hereby agree
that the receipt of either of us shall be a full acquaintance and discharge to The Continental Bank and Trust
Company, Salt Lake City, therefor. Each of the undersigned does hereby appoint the other as his or her
lawful attorney to endorse in his or her name any
checks, darfts or other negotiable instruments payable
to him or her and to deposit the same in the joint
account of the undersigned in The Continental Bank
and Trust Company, Salt Lake City."
Without the procedural advantage of a presumption in
her favor, Mrs. Demiris has failed to prove anything other
than the limited agency granted by the bank deposit card. By
her own testimony, she laid no claim to the money other than
by gift from her husband and all of the evidence introduced,
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including the defendant's, is consistent with the vtew that
Mr. Demiris gave her the power to draw upon the accounts
containing money which he had disposed of by will for
business convenience only. Therefore, the trial court erred in
failing to award these two accounts to the deceased's estate.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE
THAT IF A JOINT TENANCY WAS CREATED IN ANY
OF THE ACCOUNTS AND IN THE U. S. SAVINGS
BONDS, THAT SUCH JOINT TENANCY WAS TERMINATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL BY DEFENDANT OF
THE ENTIRE AMOUNTS IN THE ACCOUNTS AND THE
CASHING OF THE BONDS DURING THE LIFETIME
OF HER HUSBAND.
A. No Joint Tenancy Was Created.

A further reconciliation of the Utah cases is suggested
in the cases themselves. In Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum,
63 Utah 353, 255 P. 1089, where the parties opened and
contributed to the account, the prior gift cases were distinguished: "In each of those cases the question determined
by the court was whether there was a gift inter vivos, not
whether there had been the creation of a joint ownership
with right of survivorship." In First Security Bank v. Burgi,
122 Utah 445, 251 P. 2d 297, it is stated, "Likewise it is true
that the fact that all the funds are contributed by one of the
parties will not prevent the creation of a joint tenancy in the
account if all of the essentials for the creation of such estate
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exist/' (Emphasis ours). This reasoning suggests the necessity of the presence of the four unities, interest, title, time
and possession, which from the recited evidence are not present
in this case.

In 7 Am. Jur., Banks, sec. 435, p. 307, the necessity for
the existence of the unities is discussed and it is pointed out
that absent a modifying statute, it is practically impossible
to achieve the four unities in a bank account originally owned
by one of the depositors. "This rule as to unities has been
modified by statute in some jurisdictions; these statutes, though,
do not in general abolish all the unities required."
B. The Joint Estate Was Destroyed by the Withdrawal
of More Than One-Half of the Funds During the
Lifetime of Both of the Joint Tenants.

While Mr. Demiris was alive, there existed a presumption
that he retained at least one-half ownership in all of the
accounts and bonds, Greener v. Greener, supra. Therefore,
upon the destruction of the unities of ownership, interest,
title, and time, by the severance by Mrs. Demiris, the joint
estate was extinguished, Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5
Utah 2d 350, 301 P. 2d 1086, and Mrs. Demiris cannot claim
survivorship rights even though it be held that an inter vivos
gift was made. This rule has been applied to joint bank
accounts in the cases of Steinmetz v Steinmetz, 130 N.J. Eq.
176, 21 A. 2d 743; and other New Jersey and Pennsylvania
cases cited in 161 A.L.R. 80.
The Steinmetz case arose under facts almost identical
to the present case .. The third and fourth paragraphs of the
syllabus by the court read:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'' 3. During the life of the husban~ and _wife the
moneys on deposit in such accounts pnma faoe belong
to them equally. The wife's withdrawal _of all n:oneys
in the accounts while the husband was altve and msane
destroyed the joint tenancy so far as her interest was
concerned, including her right to have the joint funds
as survivor.
"4. By taking absolute possession of the entire joint
funds the wife became a tenant in common of the
funds to the extent of her one-half interest. She held
the half share of her husband cotenant as agent or
trustee for him, which share her husband's administrator is entitled to recover from her."
This ruling was made upon cards definitely creating a
joint tenancy, unlike the Continental Bank cards, and reading:
"This account is opened by us and intended to create
a joint estate to us as joint tenants and not as tenants
. common. "
1n
and a second card reading:
"This account and all moneys to be credited to it
belong to us as joint tenants and will be the absolute
property of the survivor of us; either and the survivor
to draw."
No evidence was offered to show the purpose or intent of
the parties in opening the accounts.
'' . . . But the wife took advantage of her husband's
disability and seized the entire joint funds in an inequitable attempt to deprive him of all interest and
rights therein. Had he not then been under disability
and had he brought suit against his wife for accounting for his share of their joint funds, there can be
110 doubt that 011 the facts as disclosed in this case
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he would have been adjudged to have an interest in
the joint funds.
" ... By Mrs. Steinmetz's act, she severed the unity
of interest and possession which had theretofore existed
between her husband and herself and she thereby
destroyed the joint tenancy so far as her interest was
concerned, including her right to have the joint funds
as survivor.''
Thus it was decreed in the Steinmetz case that Mrs.
Steinmetz pay over to her husband's administrator one-half
of the money in the joint accounts.

CONCLUSION

~

~-

bi

~

~

ec
~

It is respectfully submitted that the evidence demonstrates
that James Demiris was incompetent at the time he purportedly made transfers of his property which he had previously
willed to the intervenors. The evidence further shows that
James Demiris during the latter days of his life, being ill
and dependent, was under the influence of a domineering wife
who abused the confidential relationship between them and
obtained an unfair advantage over him. Since this is an equity
case, the Court is not bound by the findings of the trial court
and may examine anew the evidence in regard to these points.

However, even should the Court determine the issues
of incompetency or undue influence in Appellants' favor, there
still remains to be determined the effect of making the accounts
joint and the effect of withdrawal of the funds by one joint
depositor in disparagement of the rights of the other joint
depositor who was the true owner, because some of the accounts
()1
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existed as joint accounts prior to December 5, 1956; and all
of the accounts were withdrawn by the defendant prior to
Jim Demiris's death.
This marriage, arranged by mutual friends, did not, unfortunately produce the affection, understanding, and companionship that had been sought. This was a barren, unhappy
marriage, filled with dissension and frustration. The actions
and conduct of the defendant in acquiring most of the deceased's estate while he was in a state of incompetency clearly
thwarted his desires, and to sanction this conduct would create
a most unjust and shocking result.
Jim Demiris provided very adequately for his wife upon
his death under the terms of his Last Will and Testament.
The specific bequest of $10,000.00 to his four brothers and
one sister still left approximately $50,000.00 to go to his wife,
in addition to a $10,000.00 insurance policy on which she was
the beneficiary. This appeal seeks only to achieve the results
which Jim Demiris proposed in his Will and repeatedly expressed throughout his life.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID K. W ATKISS
721 Cont'l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
NATHAN J. FULLMER
619 Cont'l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
D. F. WILKINS
305 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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